The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century Paperback – Illustrated, January 26, 2010

Futurist and CEO of Stratfor, a private intelligence firm, George Friedman looks out over the new century to discern the long term trends which will shape events for years to come. While it's unlikely most of us will be around to judge the accuracy of Friedman's predictions they make for interesting reading and sometimes surprising twists on current expectations. Noting that history in the U.S. seems to proceed in 20 year and 50 year cycles, Friedman tells us that, far from being in decline, the U.S. is really just coming into its own and will likely grow in power and global dominance over the next 100 years. In fact, he suggests the constant American concern about its own decline is really symptomatic of a still uncertain adolescent rather than a more mature nation. Because America is still in its awkward but maturing stage, we cannot help but blunder about, notes Friedman, but we are big enough and robust enough to make lots of mistakes without hurting our interests in any serious way.Still, he suggests, other nations and peoples will not be able to help but dislike, and align themselves against, us anymore than we can help acting in our own interests.Beginning with the trend of globalization he argues that, as the world modernizes, the incentive to procreate will continue to diminish resulting in a significant downturn in world populations. In urban societies, larger numbers of children, he reminds us, are a burden on their parents, not a boon. Given this he suggests that:1) Global Warming, though in his view real and manmade (as claimed by its proponents), will start to ease because demand will drop of its own accord; and2) The energy crisis will diminish because of the demand drop as well.As populations trend downward, population replenishment will become the major problem for nation states in this century. Western European nations (England, France, Germany, etc.) are already in advanced decline, he argues, their culture one of cynicism and relativism. The population of these nations will continue to be disproportionately older, as well, as they experience a more rapid population drop-off than in many other parts of the world, including North America. Their economies will be correspondingly less robust, he argues, too.Regarding current events, he suggests that the American war with the Jihadists already looks to be over. America, he says, has won because America is in a position of global dominance and so doesn't need to defeat its enemies. It must only keep them off balance. Russia, he adds, though now in the throes of a revanchist resurgence under Putin will not be able to sustain this because of its radical population decline and lack of new inflows of people. He believes a revived Russian Empire will reclaim its "near abroad" in the short term but will self-destruct some time in the 2020's because of demographic problems, leaving a vacuum that, he predicts, will be filled by an eastern bloc in Europe led by Poland (the largest and most energetic of the eastern European states), and by Turkey, a nation well-positioned to dominate southern Russia and its environs, along with the eastern Mediterranean and much of the Near East.In the far east he thinks China will self-destruct shortly after Russia because the Chinese system is sitting on a population that is much poorer than it looks with greater wealth disparities. He believes that the inherent weaknesses this represents will lead to a break down in the current Communist regime's ability to exert central control over the bulk of Chinese territory and that the regions on the coast will follow their own economic interest, leading them to work with other nations, like Japan, to the detriment of the central Chinese authority. The relative isolation of China (landlocked on three sides with border regions that are difficult to occupy or traverse -- from the Himalayas to the Gobi desert and from Siberia to the jungles of Southeast Asia) works against China exerting much influence beyond its borders in these directions while the eastern coastal regions, following their own self-interest, will break away, either in fact or de jure, ulitmately weakening the Chinese polity.On the other hand, he thinks Japan will see a resurgence, thanks to Japanese education and industry and its traditional access to areas beyond its borders via the sea. But, because Japan suffers the same demographic problems as other top tier urbanized states, while having a strong disinclination to permit non-Japanese to enter its homeland and dilute the native culture, it will turn outward and aim to dominate a fragmented China in the western Pacific region, seeking both resources and population to fuel its manufacturing engine. Thus Japan will again look for empire at China's expense as it has done in the past.Friedman thinks the U.S. is best positioned geographically for continued global dominance because it controls North America which sits astride the two major oceans and because the U.S. system continues to attract new immigrants, thereby enabling it to continue to grow (or at least shrink less), while other major modern states are feeling deeper population losses. But, because of the U.S. global role, it will continue to have a vested interest in ensuring that no other state arises to challenge its dominance. (This is not a function of explicit American planning but of national dynamics, i.e., any state in this position, he says, would act in roughly the same way out of national self-interest). Thus the U.S. need not win all its conflicts on Friedman's view. It only has to make sure no one else manages to win theirs in certain critical theaters so that potential challengers never achieve enough stability to threaten U.S. dominance.But other nations, driven by these same kinds of concerns will not be able to keep from challenging the U.S. Thus Japan and Turkey will gradually find themselves in a position, he argues, that puts them at odds with the U.S. (about mid-century). By that point Friedman predicts the U.S. will have shifted its military focus to control of the orbital areas around Earth and to reliance on manned, fixed spy and missile launching satellites, with pinpoint targeting capabilities. There will also be occupation of the moon for research and military applications. Control of these area will become paramount to American power. He assumes other nations will also go into space and operate on the moon, too.As the U.S. moves to prevent Japan and Turkey from achieving irreversible hegemony in their regions, these two powers will see it as in their interest to act against the U.S. and initiate a pre-emptive strike some time around 2050 against the U.S., beginning with an attack on American spy and missile launching satellites. He thinks the attack will likely succeed, at least initially, but that the U.S.'s geographic and resource advantages, combined with an alliance with the Polish bloc, that will by then be at odds with the growing Turkish power, will eventually lead to a reversal of fortunes, the U.S. and Poland defeating Turkey and Japan, just as the U.S., Britain and the U.S.S.R. defeated the Axis powers (Germany, Italy and Japan) in World War II.In the course of this war, he predicts the U.S. military will make huge technological strides in space, accelerated by wartime demands. This will result in the replacement of carbon fuels, including oil, with solar power collected in space and beamed to Earth in the war's aftermath, giving the U.S. dominance in energy supplies, too.But the opening up of U.S. immigration floodgates that will have occurred in the earlier part of the century and which will have been the source of much of America's continued strength and growth throughout the century will also contain the seeds of America's future problems as Mexicans emigrate into, and remain in, the American Southwest without fully giving up their cultural and national affiliations. The American Southwest, of course, was once part of Mexico and was wrested away by the U.S. via the Texas rebellion and the later Mexican War. The new substantial Hispanic population in this part of the U.S., Friedman predicts, will result in yet another war with a stronger and more economically robust Mexico by the end of the century, a war whose outcome will determine which country, the U.S. or Mexico, will control North America and thus claim global dominance for the following century.Intriguingly, he sees little likelihood of a resurgent Islam restoring the medieval Islamic caliphate that once dominated the world, citing too much factionalism and geographic fragmentation in the Muslim world. Yet he takes no account of the fact that once before, in the eighth and ninth centuries AD, Islam DID in fact achieve such unification without benefit of geographical or even demographic advantages.Aside from his overly easy dismissal of Islam's potential to alter the global picture, this was a fascinating and perceptive analysis of current and likely future trends based on historical precedent, human and national natures and the physical facts underlying the distribution and interaction of nations and peoples. An important book, even if only some of its predictions hold up, it's just too bad most of us are going to miss the end of the show!Stuart W. Mirskyauthor of the historical novel The King of Vinland's Sagaand A Raft on the River, the true story of one fifteen year old girl's survival in Nazi occupied Poland during World War II

I love coming across well-articulated viewpoints that challenge my own. It's almost always a win-win situation when this happens.If I am convinced of the new point of view on its merits, then my worldview has been enhanced. My stance has moved from a position that is less correct to one that is more correct. If I remain unconvinced, on the other hand, then my original viewpoint has been strengthened... stress-tested and found worthy, as it were. And either way, new layers of nuance and subtlety are always a plus.My views were certainly challenged - and yours will be too - by the stance in George Friedman's new book, "The Next 100 Years: A Forecast for the 21st Century."The book pulls no punches. There are predictions in here that will surprise your socks off. Just consider some of the timeline bullets from the front cover:* 2020: China Fragments.* 2050: Global War Between U.S., Turkey, Poland, and Japan - The New Great Powers.* 2080: Space-Based Energy Powers Earth.* 2100: Mexico Challenges U.S.If your initial reaction is anything similar to mine, it runs along the lines of "What?!? Is this guy smoking banana peels?"Most assuredly he is not. Friedman is the founder and CEO of Stratfor, an outfit billed as "the world's leading private intelligence and forecasting company." Geopolitics is Friedman's game... and it's a game he takes very seriously.Expect the UnexpectedConventional thinkers dismiss wildly unexpected views out of hand. For Friedman, that's the whole point. "Expect the unexpected" is a geopolitical forecaster's mantra. This point is hammered home in the introduction of the book, in which the reader is taken on a series of 20-year jumps through the 20th century. With each jump, the landscape looks radically different.Friedman's point in highlighting these radical landscape shifts is not that some mystical cycle kicks in like clockwork every two decades. It's merely that, when it comes to geopolitics and major world events, conventional wisdom is almost always wrong. The present order of things is no guide as to how things will look two decades out.China as Backwater?Friedman's views on China are particularly eye-opening."I don't share the view that China is going to be a major world power," he writes. "I don't even believe it will hold together as a unified country... China is important, however, because it appears to be the most likely global challenger in the near term - at least in the minds of others."You need extremely powerful arguments to back statements like this one, and Friedman has them. He looks at China from a number of angles many others have not considered - and his arguments make sense. China has a number of geographical and cultural hurdles that will prove very tough to overcome.Many point to China's 30 years of breakneck growth. If Friedman is right in his view that "30 years is not a very long time" and that China will revert back to isolationist trend, the world will look very different ten years on than many of us expected.Friedman may well be wrong, of course... but he isn't just stirring the pot for the sake of being controversial. His logic is coherent.Oceans Trump AllTake the emphasis on naval power, for example. One of the reasons Friedman expects the U.S. to dominate is because of America's absolute dominance of the world's oceans."The United States Navy controls all of the oceans in the world," Friedman opines. "Whether it's a junk in the south China Sea, a dhow off the African coast, a tanker in the Persian Gulf, or a cabin cruiser in the Caribbean, every ship in the world moves under the eyes of American satellites in space and its movement is guaranteed - or denied - at will by the US Navy."In the European Age, transatlantic trade was the key to wealth and prosperity. But then, closer to the end of the 20th century, something momentous happened. Transpacific trade - that is to say, trade across the Pacific Ocean, as opposed to the Atlantic - began to rise up.This shift heavily favors the United States as the only great power with coastal access to both oceans - Atlantic and Pacific. This factors huge in the geopolitical calculus that sits at the heart of Friedman's work.What's more, Friedman argues, the United States does not have to win wars. Because America has already established global geopolitical dominance, the goal is to disrupt any and all attempts of other regional powers to form. If this means fomenting an expensive conflict that America appears to "lose," then that's fine - because the strategic goal is not to win, but merely to keep competitive alliances from forming.America as AdolescentFriedman further compares the United States to an "adolescent" - still young and belligerent, not yet confident in its own ability to project and wield power.This moody teenager mindset explains a lot when it comes to thinking about US foreign policy: the undercurrents of extreme insecurity interwoven with brash outbursts of confidence... the clumsy willingness to stomp around like a bull in a China shop (no pun intended)... and so on.It is truly a unique point of view. America in the very early stages of influence on the world stage, rather than the days of twilight? Who would have thought? It's a hallmark of US culture, Friedman points out, to be deeply insecure about certain things - while at the same time harboring that deep streak of brashness.To his credit, Friedman is the only analyst I've come across who has made a serious effort to consider military power, alongside economic power, in his forecasts.And Friedman has thought about the economics too. In "The Next 100 Years" he makes the further argument that America is vastly underpopulated yet growing (whereas other competitors are shrinking) and that certain aspects of agricultural production and economic resilience will also make a real long-run difference.Guaranteed To Make You ThinkThere are plenty of other crazy-yet-plausible assertions in this book that are guaranteed to make you think. (Poland and Turkey as two of the next "great powers?" Wow! And there are even wilder ideas than that...)I don't embrace Friedman's ideas without reservation. But "The Next 100 Years" has certainly made me think, and think hard, on some of the more popular forecast notions I've long entertained.